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Abstract 
Discerning, negotiating, and communicating priorities are necessary tasks for the U.S. defense 
acquisition system to effectively implement its portion of the National Defense Strategy. One of 
the Department of Defense’s central tools for doing so is the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), 
a projection of the cost and composition of the force over the next 5 years. This project created a 
dataset and employs it to study FYDP reliability, focusing on two sources of uncertainty: 
differences in approach between military departments and differences in volatility between those 
line items in the base budget and those that include contingency operation spending.  
Introduction  
For the U.S. defense acquisition system to properly implement its portion of the National 
Defense Strategy, it must effectively discern, negotiate, and communicate its priorities. One of 
the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) central tools for this process is the Future Years Defense 
Plan (FYDP), a projection of the cost and composition of the force over the next 5 years. 
Annually updated and submitted as part of the president’s budget submission projection, 
the FYDP provides important insights into the DoD’s priorities and projections of the future, both 
internally and externally. Internally within the DoD, wherein the FYDP is constructed, the 
process forces the stakeholders involved to debate tradeoffs and outline their visions of the 
future. Externally, it lays out for Congress a vision of how U.S. national security strategies could 
be implemented in practice, which the legislature must then choose whether to fund or alter. It 
helps the U.S. defense industry understand where the DoD plans to invest and thereby allows 
companies within the industry to align themselves with current priorities. It helps scholars 
identify trends and do research on major capital-intensive projects, which can be used to inform 
future projects, both defense and nondefense. It helps U.S. citizens identify how the government 
plans to spend its taxpayers’ dollars. However, the FYDP has a few major drawbacks for these 
stakeholders that undercut its ability to communicate priorities. 
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The first drawback is the inherent tension between the FYDP’s role expressing the 
funding amount that the executive branch deems necessary to support the strategy and its role 
in creating a plan that can be implemented within the funding amount authorized and 
appropriated by Congress.  
A second, related, shortfall is the absence of any measure of reliability or predictive 
intervals for the projections. Some parts of the DoD budget are easier to predict than others, but 
the point estimate provided by the FYDP does not differentiate between known quantities, like 
the purchase of uniforms, and cutting-edge technology, like the development of a next-
generation alloy. That said, by design, Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budgets 
operate as a pressure valve for uncertainty by taking some of the most volatile spending out of 
the base budgets and FYDP and managing them through OCO methods instead. However, the 
intended functionality of the OCO accounts is muddled when predictable spending is moved to 
OCO accounts to avoid budget caps. 
Third, the unclassified FYDP is released in a form that makes it straightforward to study 
topline spending or individual line items or programs but challenging to analyze anything in 
between. This is because the FYDP is released in dozens of PDFs through separate justification 
books, and not as a centralized database or even in summary documents. Collectively, these 
limitations present a higher barrier to entry to stakeholders and make it laborious for specialists 
and unappealing for anyone else to put investment plans in a meaningful context.  
The FYDP is a system for planning rather than a forecasting tool, but there are 
nonetheless multiple benefits to understanding the relationship between its projections and 
actual spending. First, stakeholders can better employ the system and its results if its strengths 
and biases are more transparent. Second, this analysis can put common assumptions to the 
test, for example, the volatility of OCO spending or if the long-term Navy Shipbuilding planning 
process results in more accurate projections of future needs. Third, for the defense industry, the 
difference between projected and actual spending can be a key indicator of risk and aid in 
investment planning. Finally, defense spending must often respond to external changes and 
updated strategies; large gaps can indicate not just failure of prediction but also speed in 
adapting the larger defense enterprise to new priorities. 
This project has created a dataset to ease research of the FYDP and uses that dataset 
to address the question, How reliable are projections within the FYDP as an indicator for actual 
spending? It tests the value of the unclassified FYDP for investment spending, RDT&E and 
Procurement, as a bottom-up indicator of DoD priorities by comparing cumulative projections 
through fiscal year (FY) 2019 spending from 1, 3, and 5 years in advance with the actual 
cumulative spending. In addition, the paper examines whether there are differences between 
military departments and between line items that do and do not include OCO spending.  
Literature Review 
There are a multitude of challenges in defense planning even within the base budget. 
The United States, despite its resources and robust analytical staff, faces more difficult 
challenges than those of many of its peer countries. First, the United States is a presidential 
system with projections prepared by the executive branch but funding authority resting with 
Congress. A projection process could be designed that does more to incorporate congressional 
opinions into the planning process, but the role of two co-equal branches of government means 
that some degree of uncertainty for both the topline funding and for individual projects of interest 
to the legislature is irreducible. 
Second, the United States is the global leader in defense research and development, 
and as Light et al. (2017) find, “there is a considerable amount of cost and schedule growth risk 
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facing all [Major Defense Acquisition Programs] at [Milestone] B” when the DoD commits to 
significant development spending (p. 44). Even a better estimation approach would be highly 
unlikely to eliminate uncertainty in defense research and development. 
In analyzing the 2020 President’s Budget (PB2020), Matthew Woodward and David 
Arthur (2019) draw on the FYDP and project specific reporting. Employing historical factors 
developed from studies by the RAND Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analysis, 
including those referenced previously, they find that “using the resulting cost estimates instead 
of DoD’s cost estimates raises total projected acquisition costs by 3.5 percent over the FYDP 
period and by 6.1 percent over the 2026–2035 period” (p. 16). 
The relationship between these project estimates and the larger FYDP projections is 
complex, with estimated cost influencing budget requests and a sense of total available funds 
influencing what the budget is able to fund and at what level. For example, the CBO estimates 
explore the cost implications of the President’s Budget by keeping present plans constant. In 
practice, MDAPs and other budget lines can be descoped, slowed down, or canceled outright.  
Topline FYDP projections should not be treated simply as a sum of composite budget 
lines but as a consequential form of estimating in their own right. As Todd Harrison and Seamus 
Daniels (2020) note, 
Previous inflection points in the defense budget, both up and down, have been 
influenced by wars, shifts in strategy, changes in the threat environment, and 
economic conditions. ... While there does not appear to be appetite to cut the 
defense budget in the remainder of FY 2020 or in FY 2021, as is evident by the 
inclusion of additional defense funding in stimulus bills, the political environment 
could shift markedly once an economic recovery is underway in FY 2022 or FY 
2023. (pp. 57–58) 
While the pandemic makes the present particularly challenging to forecast, the problem has 
never been an easy one for the DoD. Kevin Lewis (1994) finds that plans routinely expect small 
incremental changes, but in practice, changes, in topline spending or individual programs, are 
regularly more dramatic and often cyclical (pp. 110–113). Leland Jordan (2015) goes further 
and argues that historically most administrations project more funding than materializes, 
showing “systematic fiscal optimism” (p. 274). Jordan (2015) analyzed budgets from 1975 to 
1995 and discovered that 70% of the projections exceeded the appropriated amounts (pp. 282–
283). 
Effective projection should introduce difficult choices in the present, before expensive 
commitments have been made, rather than in the future, where cost overruns or budget 
shortfalls may lead to the termination of programs experiencing difficulty or redirection of funds 
from programs that are presently successful. Jordan (2015) concludes that “those 
administrations having demonstrated the greatest bias in their real growth projections also most 
seriously handicapped program managers” (p. 288).  
Enduring Budget in Overseas Contingency Operations 
As mentioned in the introduction, OCO budgets acknowledge the existence of 
uncertainty due to external events such as wars or other cases where events beyond the control 
of the DoD require rapid responses. However, the distinction between the base budget and 
OCO has been undercut by budgetary maneuvering since the passage of the Budget Control 
Act (BCA) of 2011. In an attempt to reduce federal budget deficits, the BCA established 
spending limits on discretionary budget authority, applying to both defense and non-defense 
programs. These limits do not apply to the OCO budget. Subsequently, the executive and 
legislative branches have evaded the caps by transferring some predictable enduring spending 
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out of the base budget and into OCO spending. This approach has been criticized by some 
defense experts and government officials from both parties. Katherine Blakeley and Lawrence 
Korb (2014) from the Center for American Progress voice their concerns that “financially, the 
free flow of war funding has decimated any pretense of fiscal discipline at the Pentagon. … 
Unclear budget guidance and poor financial management have allowed DoD to pay for 
substantial enduring costs with war funding rather than the base budget, further muddying the 
waters” (p. 28). Then Acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney also criticized in strong 
terms the “use of OCO funding for base budget requirements” (McGarry & Epstein, 2019, p. 9).  
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that from 2006 to 2018, more than 
$50 billion in OCO funding per year (in 2019 dollars), on average, has gone toward the costs of 
enduring activities rather than the temporary costs of overseas operations. This is particularly 
transparent in the FY 2020 President’s Budget. As Harrison and Daniels (2020) report, “the 
request shifted entire categories of funding, such as Army Ammunition Procurement, from the 
base budget into OCO” (pp. 4). With the coming expiration of the BCA caps in FY 2021, the 
FYDP released with the FY 2020 budget request then shifts all the money back to base 
spending after the expiration.  
The insertion of enduring items within the OCO budget does not necessarily undermine 
the value of OCO in those cases where it is still used as intended. Andrew Hunter (2019) 
defends OCO by noting that in the last decade, a major portion of OCO funds was used to 
support the operations of Afghan security forces. As the actual size, operational employment, 
and equipage of these forces have changed rapidly, OCO funds were extremely useful to 
sustain the mission. Due to the fact that the levels are not planned out a full 5 years in advance, 
OCO allows the performance of missions that might be practically impossible otherwise. 
Moreover, the origin of OCO was an attempt to bring more oversight and transparency to 
wartime emergency supplemental bills. Senator McCain, objecting to the inclusion of non-
emergency procurement in a supplemental bill,  
demanded that DoD submit its request for war funding along with the regular 
budget so that it might receive a similar level of congressional scrutiny as the base 
budget and so that it would be less easy to embellish with non-war-related funding. 
(Hunter, 2019)  
The Strategic and Communication Role of the Future Years Defense Plan  
The FYDP helps the executive branch make strategic choices and communicates them 
to internal and external audiences. Critically, the FYDP is released as part of the President’s 
Budget and thus linked to the negotiation between branches of the U.S. government. The 
numbers are provided to justify the funding requests the executive branch is making to 
Congress. As Todd Harrison and Seamus Daniels (2020) put it,  
The FYDP is therefore best understood as a statement of policy rather than a 
prediction of where the budget is headed. It is an indication, with considerable 
detail, of the Defense Department’s priorities and trade-offs among modernization, 
force structure, and readiness. (p. 11) 
This emphasis on policy and strategy provides another set of criteria that can be used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the FYDP. In particular, Thomas-Duerrel Young (2018) is critical of 
long term defense planning as practiced in the United States. While other authors have 
emphasized the benefits of budgetary stability making efficient choices, Young believes this fails 
to acknowledge the way adversaries can unpredictably shape choices. Instead, Young 
highlights two tasks that defense planners can achieve: “to produce costed priorities” and 
“creating an understanding of future financial projection of current obligations” (p. 366). For 
Young, the quality of cost estimates matters for costing priorities, but the value of the FYDP is 
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not to provide reliable predictions. Instead “the utility of these financial projections should be 
judged by how much flexibility they can provide ministers and senior defense officials to change 
the way money is being spent to produce relevant defense outcomes” (Young, 2018, p. 370). 
While strategic flexibility is inherently appealing, it does still face challenges noted by 
Kevin Lewis (1994) in his argument for defense planning humility. Lewis (2014) observes a 
range of cyclical factors in the defense budget and a shrinking portion of the budget going to 
combatant forces. He cautions, “we should expect inefficiencies, and substantially more 
negative effects on capability than might be expected from these inefficiencies, because of the 
increasing role of ‘fixed-cost’ overhead items” (p. 132). That said, the larger emphasis on the 
FYDP’s role in achieving flexibility harks back to Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith (2005), 
who reject the idea that long-range plans limit the president’s ability to implement a new strategy 
and argue that “an organization's flexibility to move in a new direction is greatly reduced if it 
lacks a clear picture of the direction in which it has been heading” (p. 50). 
Young’s (2018) emphasis on the strategic flexibility provided by the FYDP presents a 
challenge; while there has been extensive research comparing projections to actual costs, 
measuring the agility of the acquisition enterprise is a less intuitive problem. Will Domke (1984) 
provided one possible answer by analyzing how the Defense Budget responded to presidential 
priorities going back to the Eisenhower administration by analyzing the winners and losers 
among DoD funding accounts. He found that the balance between military departments change 
most at the start of an administration and more popular president’s have greater influence (p. 
389).1  
Picking up on Domke’s (1984) approach, Travis Sharp (2019) argues that what the 
current debate on gaps between strategy and resources “generally [does] not provide, however, 
is any objective sense of whether DoD is doing relatively better or worse aligning resources with 
strategy” (p. 9). Sharp (2019) considers three diagnostic tests including a Winners test that 
looks at whether spending has shifted into areas identified by the National Defense Strategy as 
priorities.2 He looks at the FYDP’s Major Program Categories and investment areas, with the 
latter only available through the President’s Budget. In both cases, Sharp (2019) finds that the 
2020 President’s Budget failed this test (p. 24). 
Data and Methods 
Data Sources and Structure  
This project focuses on budget lines rather than major programs for both financial and 
policy reasons. Todd Harrison (2016) reports that as of the FY 2016 President’s Budget, “these 
smaller programs account for an average of 57 percent of the total acquisition budget over the 
FYDP” (p. 24). Moreover, during the study period, the DoD is increasingly experimenting with 
alternate channels, including mid-tier acquisition and other transaction authority, responding to 
pressure from the Executive Branch and Congress to pursue speed and innovation. 
To better understand this era of reduced reliance on the major weapons system pipeline, 
this report chooses to focus its attention on procurement line items and RDT&E program 
elements. This is not the most detailed level of analysis available; however, it has the advantage 
of being available from multiple sources. The first pair of these sources are the P-1s for 
Procurement and R-1s for RDT&E. These budget documents are provided as spreadsheets that 
 
1 Domke (1984) does not include FYDP data in his analysis. 
2 “Instead, a winner is best defined as one that receives the largest increase in its proportional share of DoD’s total 
spending compared to what DoD’s prior outyear plans forecasted” (Sharp, 2019, p. 45). 
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cover the entire DoD enterprise, going back to the 1998 President’s Budget (DoD Comptroller, 
2020). However, these detailed and convenient documents do not include FYDP’s out years. 
Instead, for detailed future year projections at the procurement line item (P-40) and 
RDT&E program element (R-2) level, it is necessary to turn to the Justification Books. In these 
documents, the military departments and agencies lay out their spending request and describe 
what is being bought as well as providing program management details. A major challenge for 
open-source researchers is that for investment spending alone, each President’s Budget is 
accompanied by dozens of PDF files, splitting the information based on organization and 
funding account.  
This project overcomes the limitations of the justification books and does so with the 
benefit of two external sources. First, a predecessor FYDP analysis led by Gabriel Coll bulk laid 
the foundation for this project by downloading many of the justification books and conducting an 
initial analysis. A parallel effort by the CSIS’s Defense Budget Analysis (DBA) group greatly 
accelerated this effort with the discovery that the justification books, starting with the FY 2013 
FYDP, have included XML encoded spreadsheets that do not require the intensive data 
cleaning effort necessary when scraping PDFs. This past and parallel work assisted in the 
creation of the dataset, and, in the DBA case, provided a valuable source for cross checking 
totals and budget line classifications. 
To allow for cross-comparisons, the team has imported R-1 and P-1 budget requests 
from FY 2011 to FY 2021, using the most recent files and most recent columns within those 
files. Much of the effort of the dataset focused on the creation of unique identifiers, called CSIS 
budget line keys, that ease the process of tracking a budget line across different sources and 
over time. While many of the same columns are available in the R-1s and R-2s as well as in the 
P-1 and P-40s, there are discrepancies in the labels used, which are more challenging in early 
years and with procurement data in particular. For example, in some years and for some 
agencies, the line number, that is to say, the order in which it is presented in that PB, is the 
same as a line item. This causes problems as P-1s and P-40s include slightly different budget 
lines, leading to misalignment, and because order regularly changes from year to year. 
Moreover, line item standards change over time, with many budget lines changing from having a 
six-character line number to a 10-character one while still having the same broad topical focus. 
For procurement, for the analysis in this paper, all cost types pertaining to a single program are 
combined.3 
A related challenge is that in a typical year, a few score PEs and LIs will cease to 
receive funding or be tracked for the first time. This is a natural outflow of changes in strategy, 
priorities, and technology. However, some of the time, a new PE or LI does mean a genuinely 
new project but may instead reflect a change in identifiers for an existing budget line of greater 
magnitude than just an increase in the length of the identifier used. This may be a matter of a 
change of agency, such as the move from the Defense Health Agency to the Defense Health 
Program, or a reclassification, such as in the lead-up to the creation of the Space Force.  
The ties between the original sources and their unique identifiers are recorded within the 
dataset’s repository for transparency and reproducibility reasons. The study team has taken the 
additional step of classifying budget lines based on our confidence that potential confounding 
factors have been removed.  
 
3 In the early years of the dataset, Advanced Procurement LIs sometimes had a different line item than the rest of a 
program. These divergent advanced procurement budget lines have been combined by the study team with the rest 
of their program under the same CSIS budget line key. 
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Figure 3 shows a summary of the R-1 and R-2 portions of the dataset by confidence 
level in the left and right columns, respectively. The top row shows the total actual spending 
associated with the projections of each PB. For the R-1, this includes only the actual spending 
for the budget year in question. The R-2s show substantially more spending because their 
projection window covers the President’s Budget and four out years. For those cases where 
projections go beyond FY 2019, the spending amount projected is shown in gray.  
Focusing on those projections for which we know the actual spending, there are five confidence 
levels of interest: 
● No FYDP Expected: This covers budget lines, such as classified spending, that are 
typically not included in the unclassified FYDP as reported by the R-2s or P-40s.  
● Unanticipated Budget Line: This covers budget lines that did not yet exist when the PB 
was published. They may be a genuinely new budget line, or perhaps a transfer whose 
predecessor was not identified by the study team.4  
● Not Confident: This category covers budget lines that are present in one source but not 
in the other.5  
● Semi-confident: This category covers budget lines that are present in both sources but 
that have one of a range of known discrepancies. This includes having a difference 
projection between the two sources of more than $2,000. In the case where there is a 
missing cost type, budget lines are reported as semi-confident if there is a net difference 
between the two projections of $2,000 or less but the spending occurs in different years 
depending on the source. Finally, if a budget line projected spending in a future year, but 
the budget line was not reported in the year in question, it is marked as semi-confident.  
● Confident: This is the category that is the basis of most of the charts in this paper. To be 
classified as confident, both sources must report projections within $2,000 of one 
another. A budget line may end during the projection period and still be classified as 
confident, but only if the ending was anticipated by the President’s budget. These strict 
criteria are intended to limit the sample to those budget lines that are genuinely starting 
and ending rather than having overlooked connections. 
Turning again to Figure 1, the larger light blue blocks present in the R-2 column indicate that 
there is a substantial amount spent by PEs that the FYDP does not see coming years in 
advance. The lower row of Figure 1 shows the same budget lines, but using the metric of the 
count of lines rather than the amount of actual spending.  
 
4 Unanticipated Budget Line is smaller in more recent years because it is a lagging indicator and only available once 
actual spend figures are known. 
5 For procurement, this also covers cases in which there is a cost type under the budget line, for example, advanced 
procurement, that is not present in the other source and there is a net difference in projection of more than $2,000 
between the two sources. 
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Figure 1. RDT&E Actual Spending and Budget Line Count by Level of Confidence 
 
The Procurement dataset is summarized in Figure 2, and by the prevalence of red and 
yellow, shows that there are more disagreements between the P-1s and P-40s than between 
the R-1s and R-2s. There were multiple contributors to these problems. First, there were gaps in 
reporting on the P-40 side, though some of this the study team has already overcome by 
manually transcribing the PDF files that were missing XML files.6 Second, cost type categories, 
particularly reductions to adjust for prior year past procurement, were sometimes missing from 
P-40 reporting and merit closer examination.  
 
6 The most problematic absence in dollar terms had been in the Navy Shipbuilding and Construction account. For 
some President’s Budgets, key columns went unreported, but these were overcome by imputing the values using 
other available data. For both the R-2s and P-40s PB2014 and PB2015, the justification books did not include OCO 
spending with a note that those figures were to be released later. The study team imputed these values from the P-1s 
and R-1s. In PB2016, the total President’s Budget spending column was missing from the P-40s, but the study team 
imputed that number by adding base and OCO spending together for each row. In PB2017, both base and OCO 
spending were amended after the R-2s and P-40s were published, and the study team again drew from the R-1s and 
P-1s to impute the amended values. 
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Figure 2. Procurement Actual Spending and Budget Line Count by Level of Confidence 
 
All dollar amounts in this report represent current dollars. Although changes in spending 
timing (delays, shifts, etc.) occur throughout the time period, much of the FYDP estimations 
themselves have inflation concerns built into their reasoning. For statistical purposes, values 
across multiple-years have been aggregated into a cumulative expenditure; for example, 
analyzing the full 5-year window involves comparing the sum of 5 years of projection and 5 
years of actual spending. 
There are several tradeoffs to this methodology. The analysis is exchanging year-
specific sensitivity for a more robust measurement better representative of the discrepancies 
being assessed over the time periods in question. This sacrifices the ability to directly compare 
the predictive strength of different FYDP years (i.e., testing the extent to which the second and 
third out years are more reliable than the fourth and fifth out years). Likewise, this approach 
makes it harder to account for any single year having an abnormal occurrence, such as 
sequestration. In return, the variables being compared serve as a much more accurate 
representation of what is being estimated in total. From an industrial standpoint, this serves as a 
more natural portrayal of how spending is being looked at overall. 
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Results 
How Reliable Are FYDP Projections? 
Figure 3 shows cumulative FY 2019 actual spending plotted against FYDP projections 
starting in 2015.7 The Y-Axis is the Total Spend, the logged set of actual expenditures fully 
realized as outlays over given years. The X-Axis is the Projected Budget, the logged set of prior 
expenditure estimates for all budget lines expected to exist in those future actual spending 
years. The black diagonal lines represent the boundary where the projected budget is exactly 
equal to the total spend. Points to the upper left of the line have more spending than expected, 
and points to the lower right projected more spending than actually occurred. Points lying on the 
axes are the result of projected budget lines that ended up having no actual spend (x-axis) or 
budget lines appearing with actual spend that projected no spending or were unanticipated (y-
axis). The graph's different columns correspond to different comparison periods: the PB2015–
PB2019 graph includes 5 years of projections, while the PB2019–PB2019 graph includes only 
the first year with no out years. The upper row covers all budget lines, while the lower row 
includes only those budget lines where the study team is confident in the data quality. 
3
 
Figure 3. Scatter Plot showing FYDP projections versus Actual Total (Investment) 
Each of the plots has a blue regression line of best fit that estimates the relationship 
between the projections and the actual spend. The closer the line is to the black diagonal line, 
the better the projections. When limiting the sample to those budget lines where the study team 
is more confident of the data's quality, as shown in the second row of Figure 3, the quality of the 
relationship strengthens.  
Figure 4 compares the projected and total values shown in Figure 3 but uses a 
histogram to focus on the differences between the projected and total values. Only the 5-year, 
3-year, and 1-year projections are shown in this and subsequent graphs to allow the display of 
more detail. The X-Axis denotes the relative difference between projected expenditure on any 
 
7 Due to the extreme range in spending across different items, all figures will employ logarithmically transformed axes 
for statistical purposes. Logging both sides results in more normalized sets, rather than most of the points falling into 
the lower left corner due to the great variation in size of budget lines. 
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single budget line and the actual spend on that same budget line in FY 2019. Relative difference 
is used to allow the scale to include cases where the projected or the actual spending figures 
are zero.8 The Y-Axis denotes the count of budget lines with that level of difference.  
 
Figure 4. Budget Line Distribution by the Relative Difference Between Cumulative Projection and Actual 
Spending 
 
For those points in the center of each histogram, the difference between actual and 
projected values is small. The chart’s left side indicates budget line items where the projected 
value was much higher than what was eventually spent, and the right side of the chart shows 
budget line items where the estimated value was much lower than what ended up being spent. 
The groupings all display normal distribution, with the same previously mentioned 0 spend 
outliers showing on the edges, with the left edge representing cases where spending was 
projected but none took place and the right edge representing cases where zero dollars were 
projected, or the budget line was unanticipated by the PB, but spending took place nonetheless. 
The first row of the graph shows all data, and the second row shows only confident budget lines; 
note that far fewer budget lines fall at either end of the scale in the confident dataset. 
Blue dashed lines indicate the X-Axis median. The closer the estimations are to the 
actual spending, the more accurate and center-oriented the estimations end up being. There is 
a distinct drop-off in overall accuracy from the PB year estimation to the out-year estimations, 
which results in significantly wider tails for the histograms that include more out-years.  
 
8 Relative difference, for the purposes of these charts, is calculated by dividing the numerator of (Cumulative Actual 
Spending - Cumulative Projected Spending) by the denominator of (Cumulative Actual Spending - Cumulative 
Projected Spending) / 2. Relative difference is not defined in those cases where both the actual spending and the 
projected spending values are zero. 
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Which Services and Budget Categories Have the Most and Least Reliable Projections? 
This section examines whether the reliability measures discussed previously vary 
between OCO and base budget lines and when looking across military departments. For 
context, the count of P-40 and R-2 budget lines for each category is shown in Figure 5. The 
following analysis is limited to the confident budget lines, shown in dark blue. While most budget 
lines merit the confident description every year, the semi-confident and not confident categories 
can account for a reasonable amount of spending. For example, for the Navy, shipbuilding 
procurement line items, complicated by advanced procurement, have been a regular source of 
data import problems. While the number of items is small, those budget lines are of high value.  
 
Figure 5. Budget Lines by Military Department and OCO 
 
Influence of Overseas Contingency Operations 
When considering the influence of OCO, this paper classifies budget lines based on 
whether they contained any enacted OCO spending or whether the President’s Budget included 
any OCO spending. This method assumes that budget lines with planned or recent OCO 
spending may be more likely to have it in the future. A limitation of this method is that 
sometimes a budget line will add OCO spending even if it had not included it in the past. As is 
shown in Figure 5, the number of OCO line items experienced a small decline after 2013. 
However, since PB2016, the number of budget lines including OCO has increased across the 
military departments.  
When examining changes in individual budget lines, as shown in Figure 6, the first year 
of estimates, PB2019 versus PB2019, shows little difference in distribution between base-only 
lines and other lines. However, in the 3-year and 5-year projections, shown in the middle and 
left columns, respectively, the difference is much starker. The first row’s base-only budget lines 
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have peaks centered around 0 proportional difference between projected totals and actual 
spending. In contrast, that is still a high point for the budget lines including OCO, but the 
frequency is notably lower, resulting in a more rounded dome shape. Instead, a greater portion 
of budget lines are spread to the right, indicating growth. This can also be seen in the dashed 
blue lines, which show the median growth and are shifted to the right, indicating a higher 
median increase in budget lines. Note that unlike in Figure 5, this graph is simplified by only 
displaying the confident budget lines due to their superior reliability for analysis. 
 
Figure 6. Budget Line Distribution by the Relative Difference Between FY 2019 Actual and FYDP 
Projection by OCO 
Military Services 
The differences between Military Services are more subtle than those between base-
only and OCO including budget lines, and Figure 7 thus compares the median relative 
difference between projected and actual spending. Positive values are associated with more 
spending than projected, while negative values indicate projections exceeded spending. Each of 
the graphs covers a complete PB year, working from the President’s Budget only on the left to 
the 5-year FYDP on the right. The Military Departments show similar trends within each PB, as 
assumptions about topline spending levels have widespread influence. PB2013 was devised 
under the explicit assumption that a budget deal would be reached that would have reduced the 
strictness of budget caps, a belief that proved optimistic, and as a result, actual spending was 
consistently below projections. PB2014 still proved optimistic in the early years, though by the 
fifth out-year, FY2018, Army and Air Force budget lines began to spend more than had been 
projected. The last three PBs of the Obama administration all proved to underestimate eventual 
spending. In the latter two budgets, the administration transition for the FY2018 budget leads to 
particularly stark changes. Finally, the PB2018 projections also proved to underestimate future 
spending, which may be in part the result of the limited attention top-level leadership in the 
incoming administration was able to give the FYDP.  
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Figure 7. Median Relative Difference by Military Department in Confident Budget Lines 
The Army, since PB2015, has had the highest relative difference, and is also the service 
that most relies on OCO spending. The Air Force has also had relatively higher shifts in median 
spending, although these Air Force estimates are more reliable in dollar terms, suggesting that 
Air Force changes are concentrated in lower value budget lines. The pairing of the two services 
is somewhat surprising, as the Army and Air Force make the most and least use of OCO, 
respectively. 
To better understand the interplay between OCO inclusive budget lines and military 
department projection reliability, Figure 8 examines both. It shows that across the services, 
budget lines including OCO, shown in red, tend to underestimate out-year spending to a much 
greater extent than base budget lines. Indeed, the median relative difference for OCO including 
lines is repeatedly more than 20%. This unpredictability aligns with expectations, as OCO 
spending is only reported through the first year of the FYDP. So any OCO spending in 
subsequent years inherently results in the base budget figures underestimating the eventual 
funding. There are exceptions to this trend; for example, for the Army and Navy, the PB2013 
OCO budget lines consistently overestimated the spending to a greater extent than did base 
budgets. This spending reduction may be due to the greater variability of OCO-related budget 
lines, making them a more likely target for cuts once the budget caps arrived in full force.  
For both the Army and Air Force, their comparatively high medians shown in Figure 9 
can be traced to those years in which OCO inclusive budget lines rocket above 20%. Both the 
Army and Air Force have been increasing the number of OCO involved budget lines. 
Interestingly, for the Air Force, this expansion has correlated with a reduction in the degree to 
which OCO budget lines underestimate actual future spending, suggesting that these new 
OCO-involved budget lines may be easier to predict. On the other hand, the Army stands out in 
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Figure 8. Investment Military Department Topline by OCO Cumulative Percent Difference 
Discussion and Conclusions 
How Reliable Are Projections Within the FYDP as an Indicator for Actual 
Spending? 
Cumulative investment FYDP projections and actual spending highly correlate, albeit 
with generally reducing accuracy further out into the out years. Nonetheless, the bottom-up data 
does replicate previous findings regarding the top-level FYDP: There are notable differences 
between presidential budgets that with the relationship administration’s approach to the budget 
caps and the level of support from Congress pushing toward overestimation of future funding in 
PB2013 and PB2014 switching to underestimation in the later years of the Obama 
administration.  
How Does OCO Spending Relate to Projection Reliability? 
In keeping with expectations, budget lines that include OCO had less reliable out-year 
projections compared to projections by base-budget lines. As Figure 4 shows, OCO budget 
lines typically underestimate future spending, with greater than projected actual expenditures 
occurring in the out years for which OCO does not project. That said, in PB2013, Army and 
Navy OCO budget lines were particularly optimistic and experienced more significant funding 
shortfalls than other budget lines. In part, this reflects OCO serving its intended purpose of 
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Which Military Departments Have the Most and Least Reliable Projections? 
The Army, across multiple measures, has had the most substantial difference between 
total projected spending and actual spending, as shown in Figure 7. Separate analysis has 
confirmed that the correlation between Army projections and actual spending is lower than for 
the other services. As is shown in Figure 5, the Army is the predominant user of OCO-related 
budget lines. 
What Are the Unclassified FYDP’s Biggest Data Quality Problems? 
The process of building the dataset highlighted problems that the FYDP presently faces 
that undercut the applications of data science approaches to develop better forecasts and for 
analysts to track spending plans to strategy. Most noteworthy is the absence of unique 
identifiers that make it easy to speak the same language across years and sources. Budget 
lines regularly appear, disappear, and change labels. This is not inherently a problem; budget 
lines are sometimes abruptly cut and a new, and perhaps unexpected priority, receives funding. 
More challenging are the cases where funding may have shifted to a different line or the 
Justification Books or Comptroller documents have budget lines not present in the other source. 
The FYDP is a tool intended to aid defense planning, which often means changing priorities, 
and thus shifts are not just expected, but desirable. However, the data’s usability would be 
enhanced if the newly appearing budget lines reported predecessor lines in a machine-readable 
manner or indicated if they were a genuinely new initiative. 
This project takes a step to increasing the usability of FYDP data in analysis by deriving 
unique identifiers from labels in the budget documents and managing discrepancies. This 
dataset’s confidence labels are meant to be a stopgap that shows where contradictions are 
present between sources and track transitions between budget lines where identified.  
How Could FYDP Projections be Improved? 
The unclassified FYDP has the potential to be used as the basis for better projections. 
The study team held a workshop with leading practitioners and analysts to present initial results 
from this dataset. Participants made various valuable suggestions, including separately 
modeling base and OCO budget lines and looking for known budgeting foibles, such as zeroing 
out of accounts in the President’s Budget that are subsequently restored in congressional 
enactments. Modeling experiments also found that it was helpful to separately model if a budget 
line was likely to be funded at all. Unfortunately, the bottom-up approach to modeling is only half 
of the challenge, as exogenous fiscal factors can matter more than the given budget line’s 
specifics.  
Is the FYDP Fulfilling its Purpose? 
The period from PB2013 to PB2021, which covers both a significant downturn in 
spending and a large upswing, offers lessons with relevance beyond the budget caps’ 
expiration. These results demonstrate a critical strategic communication limitation of the FYDP 
during this period. OCO allows greater flexibility but is not well suited to demonstrate 
commitment, as the PB2013 experience shows that future funding assumptions may not 
manifest and budget lines that included OCO spending took more significant cuts than those 
using the traditional FYDP process. 
For those seeking budgetary tools offering both flexibility and fiscal discipline, Light et al. 
(2017) may offer a better alternative: reserve funds. For example, “funds might be held in 
reserve to address anticipated further growth within an MDAP portfolio (rather than for any 
single program)” (p. 44). Their proposal focuses on insulating the overall budget from project 
uncertainty. Still, if the reserve portfolio’s scope matches an area of strategic focus, setting 
reserves aside could be a powerful priority-setting mechanism. Such dedicated funding could 
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insulate a key strategic priority from cost increases or topline pressure and leave room for 
innovation even in the face of fiscal headwinds. 
Well-designed reserve funds may offer a way to provide flexibility while mitigating 
uncertainty but would certainly need support from key congressional committees. A more minor 
change would be to embrace Travis Sharp’s (2019) approach to measuring strategic shifts and 
to specifying priority areas within the FYDP that align with existing or new publicly available 
categories of FYDP budget lines. Updated and clearly labeled strategic capability areas or other 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive categorization systems could overcome many of the data 
quality limitations documented in this paper and would make it easier to mark a strategy to a 
budget and serve what Enthoven and Smith (2005) describe as key to the FYDP’s value: the 
way the FYDP forces “the Secretary to make controversial decisions explicitly” (p. 52). 
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